(No Working Group) S. Arciszewski
Internet-Draft Paragon Initiative Enterprises
Intended status: Informational S. Haussmann
Expires: October 21, 2018 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
April 19, 2018
PASETO: Platform-Agnostic SEcurity TOkens
draft-paragon-paseto-rfc-01
Abstract
Platform-Agnostic SEcurity TOkens (PASETOs) provide a
cryptographically secure, compact, and URL-safe representation of
claims that may be transferred between two parties. The claims are
encoded in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), version-tagged, and
either encrypted using shared-key cryptography or signed using
public-key cryptography.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Difference Between PASETO and JOSE . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PASETO Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Base64 Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Authentication Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. PAE Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. PASETO Protocol Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. PASETO Protocol Version v1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. v1.local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. v1.public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Version v1 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.1. v1.GetNonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.2. v1.Encrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.3. v1.Decrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.4. v1.Sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.5. v1.Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. PASETO Protocol Version v2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. v2.local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. v2.public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3. Version v2 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3.1. v2.Encrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3.2. v2.Decrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.3. v2.Sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.4. v2.Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Payload Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Type Safety with Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Registered Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2.1. Key-ID Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. AEAD_XChaCha20_Poly1305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Motivation for XChaCha20-Poly1305 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2. HChaCha20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2.1. Test Vector for the HChaCha20 Block Function . . . . 20
8. Intended Use-Cases for PASETO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. PASETO Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.1. PASETO v1 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1.1. v1.local (Shared-Key Encryption) Test Vectors . . . . 26
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A.1.2. v1.public (Public-Key Authentication) Test Vectors . 28
A.2. PASETO v2 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.2.1. v2.local (Shared-Key Encryption) Test Vectors . . . . 29
A.2.2. v2.public (Public-Key Authentication) Test Vectors . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction
A Platform-Agnostic SEcurity TOken (PASETO) is a cryptographically
secure, compact, and URL-safe representation of claims intended for
space-constrained environments such as HTTP Cookies, HTTP
Authorization headers, and URI query parameters. A PASETO encodes
claims to be transmitted in a JSON [RFC8259] object, and is either
encrypted symmetrically or signed using public-key cryptography.
1.1. Difference Between PASETO and JOSE
The key difference between PASETO and the JOSE family of standards
(JWS [RFC7516], JWE [RFC7517], JWK [RFC7518], JWA [RFC7518], and JWT
[RFC7519]) is that JOSE allows implementors and users to mix and
match their own choice of cryptographic algorithms (specified by the
"alg" header in JWT), while PASETO has clearly defined protocol
versions to prevent unsafe configurations from being selected.
PASETO is defined in two pieces:
1. The PASETO Message Format, defined in Section 2
2. The PASETO Protocol Version, defined in Section 3
1.2. Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. PASETO Message Format
PASETOs consist of three or four segments, separated by a period (the
ASCII character whose number, represented in hexadecimal, is 2E).
Without the Optional Footer:
version.purpose.payload
With the Optional Footer:
version.purpose.payload.footer
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If no footer is provided, implementations SHOULD NOT append a
trailing period to each payload.
The *version* is a string that represents the current version of the
protocol. Currently, two versions are specified, which each possess
their own ciphersuites. Accepted values: *v1*, *v2*.
The *purpose* is a short string describing the purpose of the token.
Accepted values: *local*, *public*.
o *local*: shared-key authenticated encryption
o *public*: public-key digital signatures; *not encrypted*
The *payload* is a string that contains the token's data. In a
"local" token, this data is encrypted with a symmetric cipher. In a
"public" token, this data is _unencrypted_.
Any optional data can be appended to the *footer*. This data is
authenticated through inclusion in the calculation of the
authentication tag along with the header and payload. The *footer*
MUST NOT be encrypted.
2.1. Base64 Encoding
The payload and footer in a PASETO MUST be encoded using base64url as
defined in [RFC4648], without "=" padding.
In this document. "b64()" refers to this unpadded variant of
base64url.
2.2. Authentication Padding
Multi-part messages (e.g. header, content, footer) are encoded in a
specific manner before being passed to the appropriate cryptographic
function.
In "local" mode, this encoding is applied to the additional
associated data (AAD). In "public" mode, which is not encrypted,
this encoding is applied to the components of the token, with respect
to the protocol version being followed.
We will refer to this process as *PAE* in this document (short for
Pre-Authentication Encoding).
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2.2.1. PAE Definition
"PAE()" accepts an array of strings.
"LE64()" encodes a 64-bit unsigned integer into a little-endian
binary string. The most significant bit MUST be set to 0 for
interoperability with programming languages that do not have unsigned
integer support.
The first 8 bytes of the output will be the number of pieces.
Currently, this will be 3 or 4. This is calculated by applying
"LE64()" to the size of the array.
Next, for each piece provided, the length of the piece is encoded via
"LE64()" and prefixed to each piece before concatenation.
function LE64(n) {
var str = '';
for (var i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
if (i === 7) {
n &= 127;
}
str += String.fromCharCode(n & 255);
n = n >>> 8;
}
return str;
}
function PAE(pieces) {
if (!Array.isArray(pieces)) {
throw TypeError('Expected an array.');
}
var count = pieces.length;
var output = LE64(count);
for (var i = 0; i < count; i++) {
output += LE64(pieces[i].length);
output += pieces[i];
}
return output;
}
JavaScript implementation of Pre-Authentication Encoding (PAE)
As a consequence:
o "PAE([])" will always return "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
o "PAE([''])" will always return
"\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
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o "PAE(['test'])" will always return "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x
00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00test"
o "PAE('test')" will throw a "TypeError"
As a result, partially controlled plaintext cannot be used to create
a collision. Either the number of pieces will differ, or the length
of one of the fields (which is prefixed to user-controlled input)
will differ, or both.
Due to the length being expressed as an unsigned 64-bit integer, it
is infeasible to encode enough data to create an integer overflow.
This is not used to encode data prior to decryption, and no decoding
function is provided or specified. This merely exists to prevent
canonicalization attacks.
3. Protocol Versions
This document defines two protocol versions, *v1* and *v2*.
Each protocol version strictly defines the cryptographic primitives
used. Changes to the primitives requires new protocol versions.
Future RFCs MAY introduce new PASETO protocol versions by continuing
the convention (e.g. *v3*, *v4*, ...).
Both *v1* and *v2* provide authentication of the entire PASETO
message, including the *version*, *purpose*, *payload*, and *footer*.
The initial recommendation is to use *v2*, allowing for upgrades to
possible future versions *v3*, *v4*, etc. when they are defined in
the future.
3.1. PASETO Protocol Guidelines
When defining future protocol versions, the following rules SHOULD or
MUST be followed:
1. Everything in a token MUST be authenticated. Attackers should
never be allowed the opportunity to alter messages freely.
* If encryption is specified, unauthenticated modes (e.g. AES-
CBC without a MAC) are forbidden.
* The nonce or initialization vector must be covered by the
authentication tag, not just the ciphertext.
2. Some degree of nonce-misuse resistance SHOULD be provided:
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* Supporting larger nonces (longer than 128-bit) is sufficient
for satisfying this requirement, provided the nonce is
generated by a cryptographically secure random number
generator, such as */dev/urandom* on Linux.
* Key-splitting and including an additional HKDF salt as part of
the nonce is sufficient for this requirement.
* Hashing the plaintext payload with the random nonce is an
acceptable strategy for mitigating random number generator
failures, but a secure random number generator SHOULD be used
even with this safeguard in place.
3. Non-deterministic, stateful, and otherwise dangerous signature
schemes (e.g. ECDSA without deterministic signatures as in
[RFC6979], XMSS) are forbidden from all PASETO protocols.
4. Public-key cryptography MUST be IND-CCA2 secure to be considered
for inclusion.
* This means that RSA with PKCS1v1.5 padding and unpadded RSA
MUST NOT ever be used in a PASETO protocol.
4. PASETO Protocol Version v1
Version *v1* is a compatibility mode composed of cryptographic
primitives likely available on legacy systems. *v1* SHOULD NOT be
used when all systems are able to use *v2*. *v1* MAY be used when
compatibility requirements include systems unable to use
cryptographic primitives from *v2*.
*v1* messages MUST use a *purpose* value of either *local* or
*public*.
4.1. v1.local
*v1.local* messages SHALL be encrypted and authenticated with *AES-
256-CTR* (AES-CTR from [RFC3686] with a 256-bit key) and *HMAC-SHA-
384* ([RFC4231]), using an *Encrypt-then-MAC* construction.
Encryption and authentication keys are split from the original key
and half the nonce, facilitated by HKDF [RFC5869] using SHA384.
Refer to the operations defined in *v1.Encrypt* and *v1.Decrypt* for
a formal definition.
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4.2. v1.public
*v1.public* messages SHALL be signed using RSASSA-PSS as defined in
[RFC8017], with 2048-bit private keys. These messages provide
authentication but do not prevent the contents from being read,
including by those without either the *public key* or the *private
key*. Refer to the operations defined in *v1.Sign* and *v1.Verify*
for a formal definition.
4.3. Version v1 Algorithms
4.3.1. v1.GetNonce
Given a message ("m") and a nonce ("n"):
1. Calculate HMAC-SHA384 of the message "m" with "n" as the key.
2. Return the leftmost 32 bytes of step 1.
4.3.2. v1.Encrypt
Given a message "m", key "k", and optional footer "f" (which defaults
to empty string):
1. Set header "h" to "v1.local."
2. Generate 32 random bytes from the OS's CSPRNG.
3. Optionally, calculate "GetNonce()" of "m" and the output of step
2 to get the nonce, "n".
* This step is to ensure that an RNG failure does not result in
a nonce-misuse condition that breaks the security of our
stream cipher.
* If this step is omitted, the output of step 2 is "n" instead.
4. Split the key ("k") into an Encryption key ("Ek") and an
Authentication key ("Ak"), using the leftmost 16 bytes of "n" as
the HKDF salt. (See below for pseudocode.)
* For encryption keys, the *info* parameter for HKDF MUST be set
to *paseto-encryption-key*.
* For authentication keys, the *info* parameter for HKDF MUST be
set to *paseto-auth-key-for-aead*.
* The output length MUST be 32 for both keys.
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5. Encrypt the message using "AES-256-CTR", using "Ek" as the key
and the rightmost 16 bytes of "n" as the nonce. We'll call this
"c". (See below for pseudocode.)
6. Pack "h", "n", "c", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE
(see Section 2.2). We'll call this "preAuth".
7. Calculate HMAC-SHA-384 of the output of "preAuth", using "Ak" as
the authentication key. We'll call this "t".
8. If "f" is:
* Empty: return h || b64(n || c || t)
* Non-empty: return h || b64(n || c || t) || "." || b64(f)
* ...where || means "concatenate"
Example code:
Ek = hkdf_sha384(
len = 32
ikm = k,
info = "paseto-encryption-key",
salt = n[0:16]
);
Ak = hkdf_sha384(
len = 32
ikm = k,
info = "paseto-auth-key-for-aead",
salt = n[0:16]
);
Step 4: Key splitting with HKDF-SHA384 as per .
c = aes256ctr_encrypt(
plaintext = m,
nonce = n[16:]
key = Ek
);
Step 5: PASETO v1 encryption (calculating c)
4.3.3. v1.Decrypt
Given a message "m", key "k", and optional footer "f" (which defaults
to empty string):
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1. If "f" is not empty, implementations MAY verify that the value
appended to the token matches some expected string "f", provided
they do so using a constant-time string compare function.
2. Verify that the message begins with "v1.local.", otherwise throw
an exception. This constant will be referred to as "h".
3. Decode the payload ("m" sans "h", "f", and the optional trailing
period between "m" and "f") from b64 to raw binary. Set:
* "n" to the leftmost 32 bytes
* "t" to the rightmost 48 bytes
* "c" to the middle remainder of the payload, excluding "n" and
"t"
4. Split the key ("k") into an Encryption key ("Ek") and an
Authentication key ("Ak"), using the leftmost 16 bytes of "n" as
the HKDF salt. (See below for pseudocode.)
* For encryption keys, the *info* parameter for HKDF MUST be set
to *paseto-encryption-key*.
* For authentication keys, the *info* parameter for HKDF MUST be
set to *paseto-auth-key-for-aead*.
* The output length MUST be 32 for both keys.
5. Pack "h", "n", "c", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE
(see Section 2.2). We'll call this "preAuth".
6. Recalculate HMAC-SHA-384 of "preAuth" using "Ak" as the key.
We'll call this "t2".
7. Compare "t" with "t2" using a constant-time string compare
function. If they are not identical, throw an exception.
8. Decrypt "c" using "AES-256-CTR", using "Ek" as the key and the
rightmost 16 bytes of "n" as the nonce, and return this value.
Example code:
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Ek = hkdf_sha384(
len = 32
ikm = k,
info = "paseto-encryption-key",
salt = n[0:16]
);
Ak = hkdf_sha384(
len = 32
ikm = k,
info = "paseto-auth-key-for-aead",
salt = n[0:16]
);
Step 4: Key splitting with HKDF-SHA384 as per .
return aes256ctr_decrypt(
cipherext = c,
nonce = n[16:]
key = Ek
);
Step 8: PASETO v1 decryption
4.3.4. v1.Sign
Given a message "m", 2048-bit RSA secret key "sk", and optional
footer "f" (which defaults to empty string):
1. Set "h" to "v1.public."
2. Pack "h", "m", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE (see
Section 2.2). We'll call this "m2".
3. Sign "m2" using RSA with the private key "sk". We'll call this
"sig". The padding mode MUST be RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017]; PKCS1v1.5
is explicitly forbidden. The public exponent "e" MUST be 65537.
The mask generating function MUST be MGF1+SHA384. The hash
function MUST be SHA384. (See below for pseudocode.)
4. If "f" is:
* Empty: return h || b64(m || sig)
* Non-empty: return h || b64(m || sig) || "." || b64(f)
* ...where || means "concatenate"
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sig = crypto_sign_rsa(
message = m2,
private_key = sk,
padding_mode = "pss",
public_exponent = 65537,
hash = "sha384"
mgf = "mgf1+sha384"
);
Pseudocode: RSA signature algorithm used in PASETO v1
4.3.5. v1.Verify
Given a signed message "sm", RSA public key "pk", and optional footer
"f" (which defaults to empty string):
1. If "f" is not empty, implementations MAY verify that the value
appended to the token matches some expected string "f", provided
they do so using a constant-time string compare function.
2. Verify that the message begins with "v1.public.", otherwise throw
an exception. This constant will be referred to as "h".
3. Decode the payload ("sm" sans "h", "f", and the optional trailing
period between "m" and "f") from b64 to raw binary. Set:
* "s" to the rightmost 256 bytes
* "m" to the leftmost remainder of the payload, excluding "s"
4. Pack "h", "m", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE (see
Section 2.2). We'll call this "m2".
5. Use RSA to verify that the signature is valid for the message.
The padding mode MUST be RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017]; PKCS1v1.5 is
explicitly forbidden. The public exponent "e" MUST be 65537.
The mask generating function MUST be MGF1+SHA384. The hash
function MUST be SHA384. (See below for pseudocode.)
6. If the signature is valid, return "m". Otherwise, throw an
exception.
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valid = crypto_sign_rsa_verify(
signature = s,
message = m2,
public_key = pk,
padding_mode = "pss",
public_exponent = 65537,
hash = "sha384"
mgf = "mgf1+sha384"
);
Pseudocode: RSA signature validation for PASETO v1
5. PASETO Protocol Version v2
Version *v2* is the RECOMMENDED protocol version. *v2* SHOULD be used
in preference to *v1*. Applications using PASETO SHOULD only support
*v2* messages, but MAY support *v1* messages if the cryptographic
primitives used in *v2* are not available on all machines.
*v2* messages MUST use a *purpose* value of either *local* or
*public*.
5.1. v2.local
*v2.local* messages MUST be encrypted with XChaCha20-Poly1305, a
variant of ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC7539] defined in Section 7. Refer
to the operations defined in *v2.Encrypt* and *v2.Decrypt* for a
formal definition.
5.2. v2.public
*v2.public* messages MUST be signed using Ed25519 [RFC8032] public
key signatures. These messages provide authentication but do not
prevent the contents from being read, including by those without
either the *public key* or the *private key*. Refer to the operations
defined in *v2.Sign* and *v2.Verify* for a formal definition.
5.3. Version v2 Algorithms
5.3.1. v2.Encrypt
Given a message "m", key "k", and optional footer "f".
1. Set header "h" to "v2.local."
2. Generate 24 random bytes from the OS's CSPRNG.
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3. Optionally, calculate BLAKE2b of the message "m" with the output
of step 2 as the key, with an output length of 24. This will be
our nonce, "n".
* This step is to ensure that an RNG failure does not result in
a nonce-misuse condition that breaks the security of our
stream cipher.
* If this step is omitted, the output of step 2 is "n" instead.
4. Pack "h", "n", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE (see
Section 2.2). We'll call this "preAuth".
5. Encrypt the message using XChaCha20-Poly1305, using an AEAD
interface such as the one provided in libsodium. (See below for
pseudocode.)
6. If "f" is:
* Empty: return h || b64(n || c)
* Non-empty: return h || b64(n || c) || "." || base64url(f)
* ...where || means "concatenate"
c = crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(
message = m
aad = preAuth
nonce = n
key = k
);
Step 5: PASETO v2 encryption (calculating c)
5.3.2. v2.Decrypt
Given a message "m", key "k", and optional footer "f".
1. If "f" is not empty, implementations MAY verify that the value
appended to the token matches some expected string "f", provided
they do so using a constant-time string compare function.
2. Verify that the message begins with "v2.local.", otherwise throw
an exception. This constant will be referred to as "h".
3. Decode the payload ("m" sans "h", "f", and the optional trailing
period between "m" and "f") from base64url to raw binary. Set:
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* "n" to the leftmost 24 bytes
* "c" to the middle remainder of the payload, excluding "n".
4. Pack "h", "n", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE (see
Section 2.2). We'll call this "preAuth"
5. Decrypt "c" using "XChaCha20-Poly1305", store the result in "p".
(See below for pseudocode.)
6. If decryption failed, throw an exception. Otherwise, return "p".
p = crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(
ciphertext = c
aad = preAuth
nonce = n
key = k
);
Step 8: PASETO v2 decryption
5.3.3. v2.Sign
Given a message "m", Ed25519 secret key "sk", and optional footer "f"
(which defaults to empty string):
1. Set "h" to "v2.public."
2. Pack "h", "m", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE (see
Section 2.2). We'll call this "m2".
3. Sign "m2" using Ed25519 "sk". We'll call this "sig". (See below
for pseudocode.)
4. If "f" is:
* Empty: return h || b64(m || sig)
* Non-empty: return h || b64(m || sig) || "." || b64(f)
* ...where || means "concatenate"
sig = crypto_sign_detached(
message = m2,
private_key = sk
);
Step 3: Generating an Ed25519 with libsodium
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5.3.4. v2.Verify
Given a signed message "sm", public key "pk", and optional footer "f"
(which defaults to empty string):
1. If "f" is not empty, implementations MAY verify that the value
appended to the token matches some expected string "f", provided
they do so using a constant-time string compare function.
2. Verify that the message begins with "v2.public.", otherwise throw
an exception. This constant will be referred to as "h".
3. Decode the payload ("sm" sans "h", "f", and the optional trailing
period between "m" and "f") from base64url to raw binary. Set:
* "s" to the rightmost 64 bytes
* "m" to the leftmost remainder of the payload, excluding "s"
4. Pack "h", "m", and "f" together (in that order) using PAE (see
Section 2.2). We'll call this "m2".
5. Use Ed25519 to verify that the signature is valid for the
message: (See below for pseudocode.)
6. If the signature is valid, return "m". Otherwise, throw an
exception.
valid = crypto_sign_verify_detached(
signature = s,
message = m2,
public_key = pk
);
Step 5: Validating the Ed25519 signature using libsodium.
6. Payload Processing
All PASETO payloads MUST be a JSON object [RFC8259].
If non-UTF-8 character sets are desired for some fields, implementors
are encouraged to use Base64url [1] encoding to preserve the original
intended binary data, but still use UTF-8 for the actual payloads.
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6.1. Type Safety with Cryptographic Keys
PASETO library implementations MUST implement some means of
preventing type confusion bugs between different cryptography keys.
For example:
o Prepending each key in memory with a magic byte to serve as a type
indicator (distinct for every combination of version and purpose).
o In object-oriented programming languages, using separate classes
for each cryptography key object that may share an interface or
common base class.
Cryptographic keys MUST require the user to state a version and a
purpose for which they will be used. Furthermore, given a
cryptographic key, it MUST NOT be possible for a user to use this key
for any version and purpose combination other than that which was
specified during the creation of this key.
6.2. Registered Claims
The following keys are reserved for use within PASETO. Users SHOULD
NOT write arbitrary/invalid data to any keys in a top-level PASETO in
the list below:
+-----+------------+--------+-------------------------------------+
| Key | Name | Type | Example |
+-----+------------+--------+-------------------------------------+
| iss | Issuer | string | {"iss":"paragonie.com"} |
| sub | Subject | string | {"sub":"test"} |
| aud | Audience | string | {"aud":"pie-hosted.com"} |
| exp | Expiration | DtTime | {"exp":"2039-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"} |
| nbf | Not Before | DtTime | {"nbf":"2038-04-01T00:00:00+00:00"} |
| iat | Issued At | DtTime | {"iat":"2038-03-17T00:00:00+00:00"} |
| jti | Token ID | string | {"jti":"87IFSGFgPNtQNNuw0AtuLttP"} |
| kid | Key-ID | string | {"kid":"stored-in-the-footer"} |
+-----+------------+--------+-------------------------------------+
In the table above, DtTime means an ISO 8601 compliant DateTime
string. See [#keyid-support] for special rules about "kid" claims.
Any other claims can be freely used. These keys are only reserved in
the top-level JSON object.
The keys in the above table are case-sensitive.
Implementors (i.e. library designers) SHOULD provide some means to
discourage setting invalid/arbitrary data to these reserved claims.
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For example: Storing any string that isn't a valid ISO 8601 DateTime
in the "exp" claim should result in an exception or error state
(depending on the programming language in question).
6.2.1. Key-ID Support
Some systems need to support key rotation, but since the payloads of
a _local_ token are always encrypted, it is impractical to store the
key id in the payload.
Instead, users should store Key-ID claims (_kid_) in the unencrypted
footer.
For example, a footer of {"kid":"gandalf0"} can be read without
needing to first decrypt the token (which would in turn allow the
user to know which key to use to decrypt the token).
Implementations SHOULD provide a means to extract the footer from a
PASETO before authentication and decryption. This is possible for
_local_ tokens because the contents of the footer are _not_
encrypted. However, the authenticity of the footer is only assured
after the authentication tag is verified.
While a key identifier can generally be safely used for selecting the
cryptographic key used to decrypt and/or verify payloads before
verification, provided that the _kid_ is a public number that is
associated with a particular key which is not supplied by attackers,
any other fields stored in the footer MUST be distrusted until the
payload has been verified.
IMPORTANT: Key identifiers MUST be independent of the actual keys
used by PASETO.
A fingerprint of the key is allowed as long as it is impractical for
an attacker to recover the key from said fingerprint.
For example, the user MUST NOT store the public key in the footer for
a *public* token and have the recipient use the provided public key.
Doing so would allow an attacker to replace the public key with one
of their own choosing, which will cause the recipient to accept any
signature for any message as valid, therefore defeating the security
goals of public-key cryptography.
Instead, it's recommended that implementors and users use a unique
identifier for each key (independent of the cryptographic key's
contents) that is used in a database or other key-value store to
select the appropriate cryptographic key. These search operations
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MUST fail closed if no valid key is found for the given key
identifier.
7. AEAD_XChaCha20_Poly1305
XChaCha20-Poly1305 is a variant of the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD
construction as defined in [RFC7539] that uses a 192-bit nonce
instead of a 64-bit nonce.
The algorithm for XChaCha20-Poly1305 is as follows:
1. Calculate a subkey from the first 16 bytes of the nonce and the
key, using HChaCha20 (Section 7.2).
2. Use the subkey and remaining 8 bytes of the nonce (prefixed with
4 NUL bytes) with AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 from [RFC7539] as
normal.
XChaCha20-Poly1305 implementations already exist in libsodium [2],
Monocypher [3], xsecretbox [4], and a standalone Go [5] library.
7.1. Motivation for XChaCha20-Poly1305
As long as ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a secure AEAD cipher and ChaCha is a
secure pseudorandom function (PRF), XChaCha20-Poly1305 is secure.
The nonce used by the original ChaCha20-Poly1305 is too short to
safely use with random strings for long-lived keys.
With XChaCha20-Poly1305, users can safely generate a random 192-bit
nonce for each message and not worry about nonce-reuse
vulnerabilities.
7.2. HChaCha20
*HChaCha20* is an intermediary step towards XChaCha20 based on the
construction and security proof used to create XSalsa20 [6], an
extended-nonce Salsa20 variant used in NaCl [7].
HChaCha20 is initialized the same way as the ChaCha cipher, except
that HChaCha20 uses a 128-bit nonce and has no counter.
Consider the two figures below, where each non-whitespace character
represents one nibble of information about the ChaCha states (all
numbers little-endian):
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cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc
kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk
bbbbbbbb nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn
ChaCha20 State: c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce
cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc
kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk
nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn
HChaCha20 State: c=constant k=key n=nonce
After initialization, proceed through the ChaCha rounds as usual.
Once the 20 ChaCha rounds have been completed, the first 128 bits and
last 128 bits of the keystream (both little-endian) are concatenated,
and this 256-bit subkey is returned.
7.2.1. Test Vector for the HChaCha20 Block Function
o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13:
14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f. The key is a sequence of
octets with no particular structure before we copy it into the
HChaCha state.
o Nonce = (00:00:00:09:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00:31:41:59:27)
After setting up the HChaCha state, it looks like this:
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c
13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c
09000000 4a000000 00000000 27594131
ChaCha state with the key setup.
After running 20 rounds (10 column rounds interleaved with 10
"diagonal rounds"), the HChaCha state looks like this:
82413b42 27b27bfe d30e4250 8a877d73
4864a70a f3cd5479 37cd6a84 ad583c7b
8355e377 127ce783 2d6a07e0 e5d06cbc
a0f9e4d5 8a74a853 c12ec413 26d3ecdc
HChaCha state after 20 rounds
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HChaCha20 will then return only the first and last rows, resulting in
the following 256-bit key:
82413b4 227b27bfe d30e4250 8a877d73
a0f9e4d 58a74a853 c12ec413 26d3ecdc
Resultant HChaCha20 subkey
8. Intended Use-Cases for PASETO
Like JWTs, PASETOs are intended to be single-use tokens, as there is
no built-in mechanism to prevent replay attacks within the token
lifetime.
o *local* tokens are intended for tamper-resistant encrypted cookies
or HTTP request parameters. A resonable example would be long-
term authentication cookies which re-establish a new session
cookie if a user checked the "remember me on this computer" box
when authenticating. To accomplish this, the server would look
use the "jti" claim in a database lookup to find the appropriate
user to associate this session with. After each new browsing
session, the "jti" would be rotated in the database and a fresh
cookie would be stored in tbe browser.
o *public* tokens are intended for one-time authentication claims
from a third party. For example, *public* PASETO would be
suitable for a protocol like OpenID Connect.
9. Security Considerations
PASETO was designed in part to address known deficits of the JOSE
standards that lead to insecure implementations.
PASETO uses versioned protocols, rather than runtime ciphersuite
negotiation, to prevent insecure algorithms from being selected.
Mix-and-match is not a robust strategy for usable security
engineering, especially when implementations have insecure default
settings.
If a severe security vulnerability is ever discovered in one of the
specified versions, a new version of the protocol that is not
affected should be decided by a team of cryptography engineers
familiar with the vulnerability in question. This prevents users
from having to rewrite and/or reconfigure their implementations to
side-step the vulnerability.
PASETO implementors should only support the two most recent protocol
versions (currently *v1* and *v2*) at any given time.
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PASETO users should beware that, although footers are authenticated,
they are never encrypted. Therefore, sensitive information MUST NOT
be stored in a footer.
Furthermore, PASETO users should beware that, if footers are employed
to implement Key Identification (*kid*), the values stored in the
footer MUST be unrelated to the actual cryptographic key used in
verifying the token as discussed in Section 6.2.1.
PASETO has no built-in mechanism to resist replay attacks within the
token's lifetime. Users SHOULD NOT attempt to use PASETO to obviate
the need for server-side data storage when designing web
applications.
PASETO's cryptography features requires the availability of a secure
random number generator, such as the getrandom(2) syscall on newer
Linux distributions, /dev/urandom on most Unix-like systems, and
CryptGenRandom on Windows computers.
The use of userspace pseudo-random number generators, even if seeded
by the operating system's cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generator, is discouraged.
Implementors should use some means of identifying different key types
so that they cannot be used in the wrong context. Encapsulating each
key in a different class and type-hinting checking that:
o Only symmetric cryptography keys are used for decrypting _local_
tokens
o Only asymmetric cryptography public keys are used for verifying
_public_ tokens
10. IANA Considerations
The IANA should reserve a new "PASETO Headers" registry for the
purpose of this document and superseding RFCs.
This document defines a suite of string prefixes for PASETO tokens,
called "PASETO Headers" (see Section 2), which consists of two parts:
o *version*, with values *v1*, *v2* defined above
o *purpose*, with the values of *local* or *public*
These two values are concatenated with a single character separator,
the ASCII period character *.*.
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Initial values for the "PASETO Headers" registry are given below;
future assignments are to be made through Expert Review [RFC8126],
such as the CFRG [8].
+-----------+-----------------------+-------------+
| Value | PASETO Header Meaning | Definition |
+-----------+-----------------------+-------------+
| v1.local | Version 1, local | Section 4.1 |
| v1.public | Version 1, public | Section 4.2 |
| v2.local | Version 2, local | Section 5.1 |
| v2.public | Version 2, public | Section 5.2 |
+-----------+-----------------------+-------------+
PASETO Headers and their respective meanings
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3686] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 3686, DOI 10.17487/RFC3686, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3686>.
[RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
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[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7539] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
Protocols", RFC 7539, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
11.2. URIs
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648#page-7
[2] https://download.libsodium.org/doc/secret-key_cryptography/
xchacha20-poly1305_construction.html
[3] https://github.com/LoupVaillant/Monocypher
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[4] https://github.com/jedisct1/xsecretbox
[5] https://github.com/aead/chacha20
[6] https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20110204.pdf
[7] https://nacl.cr.yp.to
[8] https://irtf.org/cfrg
Appendix A. PASETO Test Vectors
Note: When a nonce is given below, it refers to the value before
being hashed with the message. Typically this value is provided by a
secure random number generator.
Note: Signing may result in a different token each time, but the
given token and public key pair should validate successfully. The
private key that corresponds to this public key is as follows:
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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A.1. PASETO v1 Test Vectors
A.1.1. v1.local (Shared-Key Encryption) Test Vectors
A.1.1.1. Test Vector v1-E-1
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v1.local.WzhIh1MpbqVNXNt7-HbWvL-JwAym3Tomad9Pc2nl7wK87vGraUV
vn2bs8BBNo7jbukCNrkVID0jCK2vr5bP18G78j1bOTbBcP9HZzqnraEdspcj
d_PvrxDEhj9cS2MG5fmxtvuoHRp3M24HvxTtql9z26KTfPWxJN5bAJaAM6go
s8fnfjJO8oKiqQMaiBP_Cqncmqw8
A.1.1.2. Test Vector v1-E-2
Same as v1-E-1, but with a slightly different message.
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v1.local.w_NOpjgte4bX-2i1JAiTQzHoGUVOgc2yqKqsnYGmaPaCu_KWUkR
GlCRnOvZZxeH4HTykY7AE_jkzSXAYBkQ1QnwvKS16uTXNfnmp8IRknY76I2m
3S5qsM8klxWQQKFDuQHl8xXV0MwAoeFh9X6vbwIqrLlof3s4PMjRDwKsxYzk
Mr1RvfDI8emoPoW83q4Q60_xpHaw
A.1.1.3. Test Vector v1-E-3
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 26f75533 54482a1d 91d47846 27854b8d
a6b8042a 7966523c 2b404e8d bbe7f7f2
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v1.local.4VyfcVcFAOAbB8yEM1j1Ob7Iez5VZJy5kHNsQxmlrAwKUbOtq9c
v39T2fC0MDWafX0nQJ4grFZzTdroMvU772RW-X1oTtoFBjsl_3YYHWnwgqzs
0aFc3ejjORmKP4KUM339W3syBYyjKIOeWnsFQB6Yef-1ov9rvqt7TmwONUHe
JUYk4IK_JEdUeo_uFRqAIgHsiGCg
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A.1.1.4. Test Vector v1-E-4
Same as v1-E-3, but with a slightly different message.
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 26f75533 54482a1d 91d47846 27854b8d
a6b8042a 7966523c 2b404e8d bbe7f7f2
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v1.local.IddlRQmpk6ojcD10z1EYdLexXvYiadtY0MrYQaRnq3dnqKIWcbb
pOcgXdMIkm3_3gksirTj81bvWrWkQwcUHilt-tQo7LZK8I6HCK1V78B9YeEq
GNeeWXOyWWHoJQIe0d5nTdvejdt2Srz_5Q0QG4oiz1gB_wmv4U5pifedaZbH
XUTWXchFEi0etJ4u6tqgxZSklcec
A.1.1.5. Test Vector v1-E-5
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 26f75533 54482a1d 91d47846 27854b8d
a6b8042a 7966523c 2b404e8d bbe7f7f2
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer: {"kid":"UbkK8Y6iv4GZhFp6Tx3IWLWLfNXSEvJcdT3zdR65YZxo"}
Token: v1.local.4VyfcVcFAOAbB8yEM1j1Ob7Iez5VZJy5kHNsQxmlrAwKUbOtq9c
v39T2fC0MDWafX0nQJ4grFZzTdroMvU772RW-X1oTtoFBjsl_3YYHWnwgqzs
0aFc3ejjOR mKP4KUM339W3szA28OabR192eRqiyspQ6xPM35NMR-04-FhRJ
ZEWiF0W5oWjPVtGPjeVjm2DI4YtJg.eyJraWQiOiJVYmtLOFk2aXY0R1poRn
A2VHgzSVdMV0xmTlhTRXZKY2RUM3pkUjY1WVp4byJ9
A.1.1.6. Test Vector v1-E-6
Same as v1-E-5, but with a slightly different message.
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 26f75533 54482a1d 91d47846 27854b8d
a6b8042a 7966523c 2b404e8d bbe7f7f2
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer: {"kid":"UbkK8Y6iv4GZhFp6Tx3IWLWLfNXSEvJcdT3zdR65YZxo"}
Token: v1.local.IddlRQmpk6ojcD10z1EYdLexXvYiadtY0MrYQaRnq3dnqKIWcbb
pOcgXdMIkm3_3gksirTj81bvWrWkQwcUHilt-tQo7LZK8I6HCK1V78B9YeEq
GNeeWXOyWWHoJQIe0d5nTdvcT2vnER6NrJ7xIowvFba6J4qMlFhBnYSxHEq9
v9NlzcKsz1zscdjcAiXnEuCHyRSc.eyJraWQiOiJVYmtLOFk2aXY0R1poRnA
2VHgzSVdMV0xmTlhTRXZKY2RUM3pkUjY1WVp4byJ9
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A.1.2. v1.public (Public-Key Authentication) Test Vectors
A.1.2.1. Test Vector v1-S-1
Token: v1.public.eyJkYXRhIjoidGhpcyBpcyBhIHNpZ25lZCBtZXNzYWdlIiw
iZXhwIjoiMjAxOS0wMS0wMVQwMDowMDowMCswMDowMCJ9cIZKahKeGM5k
iAS_4D70Qbz9FIThZpxetJ6n6E6kXP_119SvQcnfCSfY_gG3D0Q2v7FEt
m2Cmj04lE6YdgiZ0RwA41WuOjXq7zSnmmHK9xOSH6_2yVgt207h1_LphJ
zVztmZzq05xxhZsV3nFPm2cCu8oPceWy-DBKjALuMZt_Xj6hWFFie96Sf
Q6i85lOsTX8Kc6SQaG-3CgThrJJ6W9DC-YfQ3lZ4TJUoY3QNYdtEgAvp1
QuWWK6xmIb8BwvkBPej5t88QUb7NcvZ15VyNw3qemQGn2ITSdpdDgwMtp
flZOeYdtuxQr1DSGO2aQyZl7s0WYn1IjdQFx6VjSQ4yfw
Public Key: -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyaTgTt53ph3p
5GHgwoGWwz5hRfWXSQA08NCOwe0FEgALWos9GCjNFCd723nCHxBtN1qd
74MSh/uN88JPIbwxKheDp4kxo4YMN5trPaF0e9G6Bj1N02HnanxFLW+g
mLbgYO/SZYfWF/M8yLBcu5Y1Ot0ZxDDDXS9wIQTtBE0ne3YbxgZJAZTU
5XqyQ1DxdzYyC5lF6yBaR5UQtCYTnXAApVRuUI2Sd6L1E2vl9bSBumZ5
IpNxkRnAwIMjeTJB/0AIELh0mE5vwdihOCbdV6alUyhKC1+1w/FW6HWc
p/JG1kKC8DPIidZ78Bbqv9YFzkAbNni5eSBOsXVBKG78Zsc8owIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
A.1.2.2. Test Vector v1-S-2
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Token: v1.public.eyJkYXRhIjoidGhpcyBpcyBhIHNpZ25lZCBtZXNzYWdlIiw
iZXhwIjoiMjAxOS0wMS0wMVQwMDowMDowMCswMDowMCJ9sBTIb0J_4mis
AuYc4-6P5iR1rQighzktpXhJ8gtrrp2MqSSDkbb8q5WZh3FhUYuW_rg2X
8aflDlTWKAqJkM3otjYwtmfwfOhRyykxRL2AfmIika_A-_MaLp9F0iw4S
1JetQQDV8GUHjosd87TZ20lT2JQLhxKjBNJSwWue8ucGhTgJcpOhXcthq
az7a2yudGyd0layzeWziBhdQpoBR6ryTdtIQX54hP59k3XCIxuYbB9qJM
pixiPAEKBcjHT74sA-uukug9VgKO7heWHwJL4Rl9ad21xyNwaxAnwAJ7C
0fN5oGv8Rl0dF11b3tRmsmbDoIokIM0Dba29x_T3YzOyg.eyJraWQiOiJ
kWWtJU3lseFFlZWNFY0hFTGZ6Rjg4VVpyd2JMb2xOaUNkcHpVSEd3OVVx
biJ9
Public Key: -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyaTgTt53ph3p
5GHgwoGWwz5hRfWXSQA08NCOwe0FEgALWos9GCjNFCd723nCHxBtN1qd
74MSh/uN88JPIbwxKheDp4kxo4YMN5trPaF0e9G6Bj1N02HnanxFLW+g
mLbgYO/SZYfWF/M8yLBcu5Y1Ot0ZxDDDXS9wIQTtBE0ne3YbxgZJAZTU
5XqyQ1DxdzYyC5lF6yBaR5UQtCYTnXAApVRuUI2Sd6L1E2vl9bSBumZ5
IpNxkRnAwIMjeTJB/0AIELh0mE5vwdihOCbdV6alUyhKC1+1w/FW6HWc
p/JG1kKC8DPIidZ78Bbqv9YFzkAbNni5eSBOsXVBKG78Zsc8owIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer: {"kid":"dYkISylxQeecEcHELfzF88UZrwbLolNiCdpzUHGw9Uqn"}
A.2. PASETO v2 Test Vectors
A.2.1. v2.local (Shared-Key Encryption) Test Vectors
A.2.1.1. Test Vector v2-E-1
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v2.local.97TTOvgwIxNGvV80XKiGZg_kD3tsXM_-qB4dZGHOeN1cTkgQ4Pn
W8888l802W8d9AvEGnoNBY3BnqHORy8a5cC8aKpbA0En8XELw2yDk2f1sVOD
yfnDbi6rEGMY3pSfCbLWMM2oHJxvlEl2XbQ
A.2.1.2. Test Vector v2-E-2
Same as v2-E-1, but with a slightly different message.
Arciszewski & Haussmann Expires October 21, 2018 [Page 29]
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Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v2.local.CH50H-HM5tzdK4kOmQ8KbIvrzJfjYUGuu5Vy9ARSFHy9owVDMYg
3-8rwtJZQjN9ABHb2njzFkvpr5cOYuRyt7CRXnHt42L5yZ7siD-4l-FoNsC7
J2OlvLlIwlG06mzQVunrFNb7Z3_CHM0PK5w
A.2.1.3. Test Vector v2-E-3
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 45742c97 6d684ff8 4ebdc0de 59809a97
cda2f64c 84fda19b
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v2.local.5K4SCXNhItIhyNuVIZcwrdtaDKiyF81-eWHScuE0idiVqCo72bb
jo07W05mqQkhLZdVbxEa5I_u5sgVk1QLkcWEcOSlLHwNpCkvmGGlbCdNExn6
Qclw3qTKIIl5-O5xRBN076fSDPo5xUCPpBA
A.2.1.4. Test Vector v2-E-4
Same as v2-E-3, but with a slightly different message.
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 45742c97 6d684ff8 4ebdc0de 59809a97
cda2f64c 84fda19b
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
Token: v2.local.pvFdDeNtXxknVPsbBCZF6MGedVhPm40SneExdClOxa9HNR8wFv7
cu1cB0B4WxDdT6oUc2toyLR6jA6sc-EUM5ll1EkeY47yYk6q8m1RCpqTIzUr
Iu3B6h232h62DPbIxtjGvNRAwsLK7LcV8oQ
A.2.1.5. Test Vector v2-E-5
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Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 45742c97 6d684ff8 4ebdc0de 59809a97
cda2f64c 84fda19b
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer: {"kid":"UbkK8Y6iv4GZhFp6Tx3IWLWLfNXSEvJcdT3zdR65YZxo"}
Token: v2.local.5K4SCXNhItIhyNuVIZcwrdtaDKiyF81-eWHScuE0idiVqCo72bb
jo07W05mqQkhLZdVbxEa5I_u5sgVk1QLkcWEcOSlLHwNpCkvmGGlbCdNExn6
Qclw3qTKIIl5-zSLIrxZqOLwcFLYbVK1SrQ.eyJraWQiOiJ6VmhNaVBCUDlm
UmYyc25FY1Q3Z0ZUaW9lQTlDT2NOeTlEZmdMMVc2MGhhTiJ9
A.2.1.6. Test Vector v2-E-6
Same as v2-E-5, but with a slightly different message.
Key: 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f
80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f
Nonce: 45742c97 6d684ff8 4ebdc0de 59809a97
cda2f64c 84fda19b
Payload: {"data":"this is a secret message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer: {"kid":"UbkK8Y6iv4GZhFp6Tx3IWLWLfNXSEvJcdT3zdR65YZxo"}
Token: v2.local.pvFdDeNtXxknVPsbBCZF6MGedVhPm40SneExdClOxa9HNR8wFv7
cu1cB0B4WxDdT6oUc2toyLR6jA6sc-EUM5ll1EkeY47yYk6q8m1RCpqTIzUr
Iu3B6h232h62DnMXKdHn_Smp6L_NfaEnZ-A.eyJraWQiOiJ6VmhNaVBCUDlm
UmYyc25FY1Q3Z0ZUaW9lQTlDT2NOeTlEZmdMMVc2MGhhTiJ9
A.2.2. v2.public (Public-Key Authentication) Test Vectors
A.2.2.1. Test Vector v2-S-1
Token: v2.public.eyJkYXRhIjoidGhpcyBpcyBhIHNpZ25lZCBtZXNzYWdlIi
wiZXhwIjoiMjAxOS0wMS0wMVQwMDowMDowMCswMDowMCJ9HQr8URrGnt
Tu7Dz9J2IF23d1M7-9lH9xiqdGyJNvzp4angPW5Esc7C5huy_M8I8_Dj
JK2ZXC2SUYuOFM-Q_5Cw
Private Key: b4cbfb43 df4ce210 727d953e 4a713307
fa19bb7d 9f850414 38d9e11b 942a3774
1eb9dbbb bc047c03 fd70604e 0071f098
7e16b28b 757225c1 1f00415d 0e20b1a2
Public Key: 1eb9dbbb bc047c03 fd70604e 0071f098
7e16b28b 757225c1 1f00415d 0e20b1a2
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer:
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A.2.2.2. Test Vector v2-S-2
Token: v2.public.eyJkYXRhIjoidGhpcyBpcyBhIHNpZ25lZCBtZXNzYWdlIi
wiZXhwIjoiMjAxOS0wMS0wMVQwMDowMDowMCswMDowMCJ9flsZsx_gYC
R0N_Ec2QxJFFpvQAs7h9HtKwbVK2n1MJ3Rz-hwe8KUqjnd8FAnIJZ601
tp7lGkguU63oGbomhoBw.eyJraWQiOiJ6VmhNaVBCUDlmUmYyc25FY1Q
3Z0ZUaW9lQTlDT2NOeTlEZmdMMVc2MGhhTiJ9
Private Key: b4cbfb43 df4ce210 727d953e 4a713307
fa19bb7d 9f850414 38d9e11b 942a3774
1eb9dbbb bc047c03 fd70604e 0071f098
7e16b28b 757225c1 1f00415d 0e20b1a2
Public Key: 1eb9dbbb bc047c03 fd70604e 0071f098
7e16b28b 757225c1 1f00415d 0e20b1a2
Payload: {"data":"this is a signed message",
"exp":"2019-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}
Footer: {"kid":"dYkISylxQeecEcHELfzF88UZrwbLolNiCdpzUHGw9Uqn"}
Authors' Addresses
Scott Arciszewski
Paragon Initiative Enterprises
United States
Email: security@paragonie.com
Steven Haussmann
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
United States
Email: hausss@rpi.edu
Arciszewski & Haussmann Expires October 21, 2018 [Page 32]
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